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People with autism have consistently been found to outperform controls on visuo-spatial tasks such as
block design, embedded figures, and visual search tasks. Plaisted, O’Riordan, and others (Bonnel et al.,
2003; O’Riordan & Plaisted, 2001; O’Riordan, Plaisted, Driver, & Baron-Cohen, 2001; Plaisted,
O’Riordan, & Baron-Cohen, 1998a, 1998b) have suggested that these findings might be explained
in terms of reduced perceptual similarity in autism, and that reduced perceptual similarity could
also account for the difficulties that people with autism have in making generalizations to novel situ-
ations. In this study, high-functioning adults with autism and ability-matched controls performed a
low-level categorization task designed to examine perceptual similarity. Results were analysed using
standard statistical techniques and modelled using a quantitative model of categorization. This analy-
sis revealed that participants with autism required reliably longer to learn the category structure than
did the control group but, contrary to the predictions of the reduced perceptual similarity hypothesis,
no evidence was found of more accurate performance by the participants with autism during the
generalization stage. Our results suggest that when all participants are attending to the same attributes
of an object in the visual domain, people with autism will not display signs of enhanced perceptual
similarity.
Autism is characterized by deficits in reciprocal
social behavior, communication, and behavioural
flexibility (American Psychiatric Association,
1994; Wing, 1996), but is also associated with
certain strengths, particularly in performance on
visuo-spatial tasks such as block design (e.g.,
Shah & Frith, 1993; Tymchuk, Simmons, &
Neafsey, 1977), the embedded figures task
(Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997; Shah & Frith,
1983; but see Brian & Bryson, 1996), and visual
search tasks (O’Riordan & Plaisted, 2001;
O’Riordan et al., 2001; Plaisted et al., 1998b). It
has been argued that studying these cognitive
strengths in autism may be particularly informa-
tive because, unlike deficits, they cannot readily
be explained in terms of general mental retardation
(Happe´, 1999b).
Frith (1989; see also Frith & Happe´, 1994;
Happe´, 1999a) proposed that many of the cogni-
tive strengths and weaknesses in autism could be
Correspondence should be addressed to Lewis Bott, Department of Psychology, New York University, 6 Washington Place,
New York, NY 10003, USA. Email: Lewis.Bott@nyu.edu
Lewis Bott is now at the Department of Psychology, New York University. Noellie Brockdorff is now at the Centre for
Communication Technology, University of Malta, Malta. Jon Brock is now at the Department of Experimental Psychology,
University of Oxford. Research was supported by an RDTF grant to Lamberts, Boucher, and Bott from the University of
Warwick. Lewis Bott was supported by a studentship from the Brain and Behavioral Sciences Research Council and by a grant
from the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (France) as part of Action Thematique et Incitative. Jon Brock was supported
by a studentship from the Williams Syndrome Foundation.
# 2006 The Experimental Psychology Society 1
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/pp/17470218.html DOI:10.1080/02724980543000196
THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
2006, 59 (0), 1–18
understood in terms of what she called “weak
central coherence”—a tendency to focus on local
details at the expense of the global “big picture”
and to process information in isolation from its
context. According to this account, people with
autism perform well on the embedded figures
task because this involves searching for a local
target in a global picture. Similarly, they perform
well on the block design task because they find it
relatively easy to break the global target pattern
down into its constituent local parts. However,
weak central coherence struggles to explain
enhanced visual search performance in autism.
Moreover, evidence from other paradigms tends
to show evidence for enhanced local processing
but little evidence for impaired global processing
(e.g., Mottron & Burack, 2001).
More recently, Plaisted and colleagues
(O’Riordan & Plaisted, 2001; O’Riordan et al.,
2001; Plaisted, 2001; Plaisted et al., 1998a,
1998b) have proposed that findings previously
attributed to weak central coherence may be
better understood in terms of reduced perceptual
similarity.1 Thus, detection of the target shape in
the embedded figures test is relatively easy
because the target is seen as being relatively dis-
similar to other shapes in the overall picture
(Plaisted, 2001). Similarly, superior performance
on visual search tasks can be explained in terms
of enhanced ability to discriminate between
the target item and similar distractor items
(O’Riordan & Plaisted, 2001, cf. Wolfe, Cave, &
Franzel, 1989). According to this account,
reduced perceptual similarity also entails a deficit
in generalization such that novel objects and
events are seen as highly distinctive from previous
experiences. Plaisted (2001) therefore suggested
that reduced similarity could explain poor
generalization of social training to real-life situa-
tions (e.g., Ozonoff & Miller, 1995; Swettenham,
1996) and the restricted range of interests shown
by many people with autism.
In support of this account, Plaisted et al.
(1998a) reported a perceptual learning study in
which, unlike controls, high-functioning adults
with autism failed to benefit from preexposure
to similar stimuli. The authors assumed that
similarity between stimuli was an increasing
function of the number of shared features and a
decreasing function of the unshared features
(cf. Tversky, 1977). They argued that individuals
with autism failed to generalize from the
preexposure phase to the test phase because they
were preferentially attending to the features that
discriminated between stimuli and therefore
failed to notice the similarity between the sets of
stimuli in the preexposure phase and the test
phase of the task. The difficulty for this account
is that the two stimuli in the preexposure phase
and the two stimuli in the test phase all differed
on the same features. Thus, by attending to the
features that discriminated between stimuli in
the different phases, participants with autism
would also have been attending to the features
that enabled discrimination between the two
stimuli within the transfer phase and should there-
fore have shown an enhanced transfer effect. An
alternative explanation for this finding is that par-
ticipants with autism were simply more likely than
controls to follow the experimenter’s instruction to
treat the test phase as a new task. This would
reflect differences in strategy (or naivety to experi-
mental manipulations) rather than perceptual
abnormalities.
The aim of the current study was to formalize
and then test the reduced perceptual similarity
1 Plaisted and O’Riordan generally express their theory in terms of “enhanced discrimination” rather than “reduced perceptual
similarity”. Although these two expressions are not identical, there is general agreement in the categorization literature that the per-
ceptual similarity of two objects is monotonically related to the extent to which they can be discriminated (see, for example, Medin &
Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986, 1987; Shepherd, 1987). Put simply, an individual who finds it relatively easy to discriminate between
two objects would also consider them relatively dissimilar. However, the concepts of discrimination and (dis)similarity are not used
interchangeably in the categorization literature, and the theory described by Plaisted et al. (1998a) corresponds better to the categ-
orization expression “reduced perceptual similarity” than to the term “enhanced discrimination”. Because the techniques and theory
employed in this article are based on standard paradigms used in perceptual categorization, we adopt the term “reduced perceptual
similarity” for the remainder of the article.
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hypothesis in terms of exemplar models of categor-
ization (e.g., Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky,
1986, 1990, 1992; Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1996).
According to such models, people represent
categories by storing individual exemplars with a
label indicating their category membership. A
novel item is categorized by computing its simi-
larity to all the exemplars in memory, summing
the similarities for each category and then assign-
ing it to the category with the highest summed
similarity to all items in memory. In fact, old
items are also categorized in the same way, by
computing similarities to all exemplars (including
themselves). This means that items that are
similar to members of another category are likely
to be misremembered. Exemplar models therefore
provide an explicit link between perceptual
similarity, categorization, and generalization, and
they allow predictions to be made about the
effect of reduced perceptual similarity on categor-
ization performance (see Hayes & Taplin, 1992,
1993a, 1993b, for a discussion of categorization
from a developmental and clinical perspective).
One prediction that can be derived from the
reduced similarity hypothesis is that people with
autism will show a reduced prototype effect
(Plaisted, 2001). The prototype of a category is
the category member whose features represent
the average of the group. As such, its summed
similarity to all the category members is higher
than that for any other item, and it is therefore
more likely to be correctly classified than any
other category member. However, if all the
members of a category are seen as highly distinc-
tive then this effect will be reduced because other
group members will exert less of a reinforcing
effect on the prototype.
Consistent with this prediction, Klinger and
Dawson (2001; see also Klinger & Dawson,
1995) reported that children with autism showed
a reduced prototype effect. Participants were
taught to discriminate between two sets of
cartoon animals. They were then presented with
two novel members of one category, one of
which was the prototype, and were asked to
decide which was the best example of that cat-
egory. Typically developing children reliably
chose the prototype over the nonprototypical
animal, but children with autism performed at
chance levels. However, one potential problem
with this study is that, although some dimensions
differed within categories, others dimensions
varied between categories only. For example, all
members of one category had octagonal bodies,
while members of other categories had bodies of
different shapes. Participants with autism may
therefore have learnt to distinguish between the
categories by attending to such invariant features
and would then have been unable to choose the
most representative example of the category.
This would have led to a reduced prototype
effect but would not imply reduced perceptual
similarity.
The current study also used a categorization
paradigm to investigate the reduced perceptual
similarity hypothesis. However, we avoided the
difficulty suggested above by employing a design
whereby participants were forced to attend to
multiple dimensions of the stimuli in order to
learn the category structure. In the training
phase of our experiment, participants learned to
classify 10 rectangles varying in height and width
into two experimenter-determined categories,
referred to as Categories A and B. Rectangles
were chosen because they could vary along con-
tinuous dimensions, thus discouraging the use of
verbalized rules. The stimuli were presented one
at a time on a computer screen, and participants
were given feedback informing them whether
their classification was correct or not. Once
participants had learned to correctly classify all
10 rectangles accurately, they proceeded onto a
test phase in which they classified the same 10 rec-
tangles together with 6 novel rectangles, but this
time without any feedback.
Figure 1 shows the coordinates of the stimuli in
terms of height and width, together with their
appropriate classification in the training phase
(either A or B). It can be seen that the majority
of the Category B rectangles are located in the
bottom left triangle of the rectangle space, while
the A rectangles are in the top right triangle.
However, there is one B rectangle (B6) that is
the exception to the general rule because it is
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located in the top right corner of the space
and is consequently surrounded by Category A
rectangles. We refer to this rectangle as the excep-
tion item, an important part of the design that we
discuss below. Note that it is not possible to learn
the correct labels of the rectangles by attending to
one dimension of the stimuli only, whether this be
height, width, area, or shape.2
Once participants had learned to correctly
classify all 10 rectangles, they proceeded onto a
test phase in which they classified the same 10
rectangles together with 6 novel rectangles, but this
time without any feedback. According to exemplar
models, classification of the exception item
involves computing the similarity of the exception
item to itself, to the Category A rectangles and to
the remaining Category B rectangles. Because the
similarity to Category A members is relatively
high, participants are likely to make more errors
in classifying the exception item. However, the
extent of this effect will be determined by how
much an individual is generally able to discrimi-
nate the different rectangles: If they have low
discrimination abilities, then the Category A
rectangles will be considered highly similar to
the exception item, so the probability of misclassi-
fication will be relatively high. But if an individ-
ual can easily discriminate the rectangles, the
interference from the surrounding A exemplars
will be low, and performance on the exception
item will be good. Thus, if people with autism
judge the rectangles to be less similar than con-
trols, then they should be better at discriminating
the exception item in the testing phase of the
experiment.
The experimental design also allowed quantitat-
ive modelling of categorization performance using
the general context model (GCM; Nosofsky,
1986). The GCM is an exemplar-based model of
categorization, which assumes that items are
classified on the basis of their similarity to all
items whose category membership is known.
Similarity is defined using Shepard’s (1987) uni-
versal law of generalization, which states that the
similarity between two objects is determined by
two factors: first the distance between the objects
in psychological space, and second a scaling
parameter representing a participant’s level of
memory sensitivity in discriminating among dis-
tinct exemplars. A high value means that the
participant distinguishes easily among items in
memory, while a low value means that exemplars
are difficult to discriminate. The reduced per-
ceptual similarity hypothesis therefore predicts
higher values of the scaling parameter for individ-
uals with autism than for controls.
We have so far emphasized predictions of the
reduced perceptual similarity hypothesis for the
testing phase of the experiment and not the train-
ing phase. This is because we wish all participants
to be equated on the extent to which they know
the training exemplars before being tested on
Figure 1. Stimuli structure for the categorization task. Each label
refers to a rectangle of a given height and width. Rectangles
marked with an A or a B refer to items that were presented in
the training phase (and belonged to category A or B respectively).
Rectangles marked with question marks indicate rectangles seen
only in the testing phase of the experiment. The numbers adjacent
to the rectangles relate to the stimuli numbers shown in Figures 2
and 3. The rectangle B6 is surrounded by A category members
and is therefore referred to as the exception item.
2 If a participant tried to classify the rectangles on the basis of height alone, then it would not be possible to correctly classify
rectangles B7 and A4 (amongst others) because they have the same height but are in different categories. Similar arguments hold
for width (e.g., rectangles B9, B8, and A2), area (rectangles A1 and B8), and shape (B8 and A4 are both square).
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generalization. By training participants until they
reach a given criterion of accuracy, we eliminate
the possibility that the different groups are
generalizing from different knowledge bases.
Nonetheless, it is possible to consider what predic-
tions could be made from the reduced perceptual
similarity hypothesis concerning category learning,
as opposed to generalization.
Recall that participants who have high discri-
mination abilities would treat the rectangles as
relatively distinct, individual items associated
with the same category label. This implies that
the exception item would be relatively easy to
learn because there would be less interference
that could arise from the surrounding rectangles
of the opposing category. However, the normal
rectangles would benefit from a high similarity
because, overall, similar rectangles are placed
within the same category. Thus, high discrimi-
nation would facilitate learning on the exception
item but would harm learning on the normal
rectangles. The reduced perceptual similarity hypo-
thesis would therefore predict that the participants
with higher functioning autism (HFA) would
have less difficulty in acquiring the exception
item than would controls, but more difficulty in
learning the normal items. Predictions for the
overall learning times are difficult to generate
because there are both costs and benefits to high
similarity, and the precise ratio cannot be deter-
mined in advance.
It is important to realize that there are many
other factors aside from exemplar similarity that
determine the speed with which participants
acquire exemplars and the overall category struc-
ture. These include individual factors such as
general confidence level and learning strategies,
factors that are difficult to control for and likely
to vary across our two groups. In general, learning
a category is a far more complex cognitive activity
than naming the exemplars, suggesting that the
clearer test of reduced perceptual similarity
would be the responses in the testing phase and
not those from the training phase.
Fitting the GCM required that participants
perform a large number of trials to eliminate
as much noise as possible from their data.
This consideration, together with the inherent
difficulty of the task, entailed that it was not pos-
sible to test children or low-functioning indi-
viduals with autism. The participants in this
study were therefore high-functioning adults
with autism and nonautistic controls matched on
verbal mental age and performance mental age.
Another requirement for modelling the data
was that we needed to know how participants
perceive the stimuli used in the experiment.
Participants may view the stimuli in the same way
as we have constructed them (as in Figure 1), or it
may be that they perceive the rectangles in different
way, by treating the rectangles as if they vary along
only one dimension: area, for example. The GCM
requires a set of psychological coordinates for the
rectangles to describe categorization performance
accurately. The most common approach to deter-
mining this set of coordinates is by performing a
similarity ratings experiment using the stimuli
that will be used in the principal experiment, in
our case the 16 rectangles shown in Figure 1.
This involves presenting participants with all pos-
sible pairs of stimuli and asking them to rate
how similar they think each of the pairs are.
These data are then analysed using a multi-
dimensional scaling (MDS) analysis that converts
the “distances” (similarity judgements) between
stimuli into a “map” where each of the stimuli is
given its own coordinates. The set of coordinates
for all the rectangles is chosen so that the distances
between stimuli on the map are as close as possible
to the original distances given by participants. The
resulting map is not restricted to two dimensions,
but can be of any dimensionality from 1 to N 2
1, where N is the number of different stimuli used
in the experiment. Choosing the most appropriate
number of dimensions for the space is generally
done a priori or on grounds of parsimony, in a
similar way to the approach taken in factor
analysis. The final map provides a representation
of the psychological space and can be used by the
GCM. In order to determine the psychological
coordinates of our stimuli, therefore, we performed
a similarity ratings experiment with our HFA and
our control participants, before commencing the
categorization study (see Kruskal & Wish, 1978,
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and Young & Harris, 1994, for useful introduc-
tions to MDS).
In addition to being a useful step in the model-
ling of the GCM, this task also allowed investi-
gation of potential differences between groups in
the representation of the stimuli. In particular,
participants might choose to encode the stimuli
using spaces of differing dimensionality. For
example, those in the HFA group may base their
similarity judgements on only one dimension of
the stimuli, whereas those in the control group
might use two dimensions. Note, however, that
it is not our aim to test the reduced perceptual
similarity hypothesis using the similarity ratings
task: Although we might expect the theory to
predict lower similarity ratings overall for the
HFA participants, differences that occur between
the groups might also arise because of response
biases that do not necessarily reflect underlying
perceptual similarity. Because the effects of
reduced perceptual similarity and response bias
would be confounded, we restrict our investigation
to differences involving the number of dimensions
on which participants represent the stimuli.
Response biases variation across individuals
would not pose a problem for our analysis
because individual ratings are normalized as part
of the MDS algorithm.
EXPERIMENT
Method
Participants
A total of 12 high-functioning adults with autism
were recruited via personal connections and local
support groups and services. They had all been
diagnosed by psychiatrists or clinical psychologists
as having Asperger syndrome. However, it was not
clear from the available information that early
language development had been entirely normal
in all cases as required by American Psychiatric
Association (1994) and World Health Organiza-
tion (1992) definitions of Asperger syndrome.
The more open term higher functioning autism
(HFA) was therefore used to describe these
participants. All were given travel expenses and a
gift voucher worth £10. A total of 17 controls
were also recruited. These participants were
undergraduate students at the University of
Warwick and were paid £10 for taking part.
Verbal mental age was assessed using the vocabu-
lary and comprehension subtests of the Wechsler
Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS; Wechsler, 1986).
Performance mental age was assessed using the
picture completion and object assembly subtests.
Participant details are summarized in Table 1.
There were no significant group differences in per-
formance mental age or verbal mental age (ts, 1),
although the HFA group were significantly older
than controls, t(27) ¼ 2.11, p ¼ .043.
Stimuli
Stimuli were 16 rectangles presented on the screen
of a computer monitor. The outline of each rec-
tangle was drawn in green single pixel lines on
a black background. The dimensions of the
rectangles represented the factorial combination
of four heights and widths, which were 30, 60,
90, and 120 pixels. The same stimuli were used
for the similarity ratings task and for the categor-
ization experiment.
Table 1. Participant details
Agea Verbal mental agea
Performance
mental agea
n No. male No. female M Range M Range M Range
HFA 12 10 2 30 20–62 27.10 17–36 19.5 7–31
Controls 17 6 11 21 19–45 27.12 20–35 21.6 17–31
aIn years.
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Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a sound-
proof booth with the experimenter in an adjoining
room. The similarity ratings task was performed
first, followed by the categorization task and
finally the WAIS subtests.
In the similarity ratings task, participants were
told that they would see pairs of rectangles pre-
sented on a computer screen and that they would
have to judge how similar they thought each pair
was. They were told to use the numbers 1–9 on
the computer keyboard to make their judgement,
1 being the least similar, and 9 being the most
similar. They then completed 480 trials in which
they saw each of the possible rectangle pairs
twice. A rectangle was never paired with itself,
and the second time a pair was presented their
positions to the left and right of the screen were
changed. Rectangle pairs were presented in a
different random order for each participant.
In the categorization task, participants were
told that one of the experimenters had chosen
some of the rectangles to be his, while the other
experimenter had chosen some of the remaining
rectangles. Participants were then told that they
had to learn which rectangles belonged to each
experimenter and that no one rectangle could
belong to both experimenters. They were
informed that they would receive feedback in the
first part of the experiment (the training phase),
but later on that feedback would disappear in the
second phase (the testing phase). They were also
told that they would see “new” rectangles in the
testing phase and that they should classify these
rectangles on the basis of the classifications that
they had made in the training phase.
In each block of the training phase, the 10
training items were each presented once in a
random order. A typical trial consisted of the pres-
entation of a fixation point (1 second) followed
by the rectangle appearing on the screen and
remaining until the participant had made their
response. All responses were made using a
standard button-box, with two buttons corre-
sponding to the two different categories of
rectangle. Feedback was provided with a high
beep if the participant responded correctly and a
low beep if they responded incorrectly. Training
continued until participants could correctly ident-
ify each of the 10 rectangles without error for four
complete blocks, whereupon they moved onto the
testing phase after a short break. There were 40
blocks in the test phase, with all 16 rectangles
being presented once in a random order in each
block, making a total of 640 trials. The procedure
was the same as that in the training phase, apart
from the absence of any feedback.
Results
Similarity ratings
The goal of this experiment was to provide a suit-
able set of coordinates for the GCM and to estab-
lish whether there might be any differences between
the perceptual representations of individuals in the
HFA and control groups. To this end, a type of
MDS known as individual scaling (INDSCAL,
Carroll & Chang, 1970) was applied, assuming
ordinal data. The INDSCAL analysis results in a
single solution for all participants together with a
set of weights for each participant dictating the
extent that the participant relies on each dimension.
The GCM can then be applied using the average
solution while differences between groups can be
analysed using the dimensional weights.
We report the results of applying MDS assum-
ing a one-, two-, or three-dimensional solution.
The stress and R2 figures that we report are the
mean of each individual participant’s fit to the
single group solution. In the two-dimensional
case, the INDSCAL analysis resulted in stress
and R2 values of .3 and .46 respectively, and for
the three dimensional case they were .23 and .52.
A replicated MDS analysis was applied to obtain
a one-dimensional solution, with accompanying
stress and R2 values of .45 and .40, respectively
(INDSCAL cannot be applied because there is
only a single dimension). We did not try to
select the solution with the most appropriate
dimensionality because we were able to fit the
GCM using each of the solutions and compare
the results (see the Model Fitting section below).
We now examine whether there are differences
between the two groups in how they perceive the
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rectangle space. One possibility is that participants
in the two groups might be making their similarity
judgements using different numbers of dimen-
sions. For example, the HFA group might prefer
to use only one dimension on which to base their
similarity ratings, while the controls might prefer
two dimensions. This hypothesis can be investi-
gated by looking at the participant weightings on
the dimensions, as a function of group. In addres-
sing this question, we are assuming that at least
some of our participants encoded the rectangles
using two or three dimensions whereas, in fact,
the R2 results reported above do not lead us to
reject the hypothesis that all participants used
only a one-dimensional solution. We proceed
with the analysis of higher dimensional solutions
because individual variation in the dimensionality
of encoding (the very question we are investigating
here) contributes to overall variance and may have
masked the extent to which it is possible to deter-
mine the best group solution.
To examine the extent to which different par-
ticipants used a different number of dimensions,
we analysed a transformation of the dimensional
weights referred to as the w-score3 (MacCallum,
1976; Young & Harris, 1994). The w-score indi-
cates how far the individual’s weightings differed
from the group average: The more a participant
relies on one dimension, the more extreme the
weight ratio becomes and the higher their
w-score. Consequently, if the HFA group were
making their similarity judgements based on
fewer dimensions than were the controls,
their w-scores should be higher. For the two-
dimensional solution, the mean w-scores were
0.242 (SD ¼ 0.158) for the HFA group, and
0.156 (SD ¼ 0.100) for the control group. A two-
tailed, equal-variance t test revealed this difference
to be narrowly nonsignificant, t(27) ¼ 2.00, p ¼
.055. Analysis of the weights for the three-dimen-
sional solution revealed a similar story, with
means of 0.27 for the HFA group and 0.2 for the
controls, t(27) ¼ 1.6, p ¼ .1. These results
provide some tentative support for the idea that
the HFA group were making their similarity judge-
ments on the basis of fewer dimensions than were
the controls.4 However, due to the difficulty of
establishing the most appropriate group space,
and the ambiguous results of the t tests, we
refrain from drawing firm conclusions regarding
differences in the representation of the
rectangle space between groups.
Categorization task
For both training and testing phases, an arcsine
transformation was carried out on all choice pro-
portions to improve the conformity of the data
to the standard assumptions of analysis of variance
(ANOVA; Howell, 1997). In the training phase,
4 of the HFA participants failed to reach the
criterion of four consecutive blocks of correct
responses. Of these, 2 failed to perform above
chance on a single block and were excluded from
all further analyses.5 The other 2 participants
3 Referred to as the “weirdness” index by Young and Harris (1994).
4 An alternative to analysing the participant weights might have been to fit two completely different solutions, one for the HFA
group and another for the control group, and to examine the degree to which each solution fitted the data. One might have expected
that, if the HFA group were basing their judgements on fewer dimensions, then the most optimal dimensionality for the HFA group
would be lower than that of the controls. However, there are two problems with this method, which would make any result difficult to
interpret. The first is that formal methods for deciding dimensionality, such as Lee’s (2001) BIC, favour a low dimensional solution
for data that has a high variance. Thus, different ideal dimensionalities could be the result of differences in the variance across groups,
rather than a difference in the perceived rectangle space. The second problem is that even if the HFA solution requires a high-
dimension solution, it could be because different participants within the group choose to base their judgements on different
dimensions. Hence, a high-dimensional solution is required to account for between-participant variation in the choice of dimensions,
even though any single participant might be best modelled with a low-dimensional solution. The INDSCAL technique that we used
avoids both of these potential problems.
5 The removal of these two HFA participants did not substantially alter the matching between our two groups. The new means
and ranges for the HFA group were: 31.2 (20–62), 27.3 (20–35), and 22 (17–31) years for age, verbal mental age, and performance
mental age, respectively. As before, there were no reliable differences between groups on the verbal and performance mental age
measures, t(25)s , 1, ps . .83, and the difference on age remained, t(25) ¼ 2.6, p ¼ .014.
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were very close to criterion (for example, getting
one response wrong out of a run of 4 blocks) and
proceeded onto the test phase after 100 training
blocks. All analyses were therefore carried out
both with and without these two noncriterion lear-
ners (NCLs). However, only the results including
the NCLs are reported, unless there were qualita-
tive differences between the conclusions of the two
analyses. One HFA participant (not an NCL)
dropped out three quarters of the way into the
test phase because he was tired. His results were
therefore based on the responses that were col-
lected (27 blocks out of 40).
Training phase
Participants in the HFA group took more blocks
than did controls to reach criterion in the training
phase t(23) ¼ 2.74, p ¼ .012, with averages of 46
and 30 blocks, respectively. NCLs were not
included in this comparison because the precise
number of blocks required for them to reach
criterion was unknown (although assuming learn-
ing times of greater than 100 blocks would
increase the difference between the two groups).
Turning to the proportion correct as the depen-
dent measure, Figure 2 shows the accuracy of
responses given to each rectangle in the training
set (NCLs included). These results were subjected
to an ANOVA with rectangle as a repeated
measure and group as a between-subjects factor.
The HFA group performed significantly worse
than controls, F(1, 27)¼ 4.43, p¼ .045, reflecting
the greater number of blocks required to reach cri-
terion. However, this effect became nonsignificant
when the NCLs were removed, F(1, 23) ¼ 3.7, p
¼ .067. There was a significant effect of rectangle,
F(1, 9) ¼ 12.07, p ¼ .001, demonstrating that the
exception item was learnt with more difficulty than
other rectangles. In fact, 7 out of the 10 partici-
pants in the HFA group and 11 of the 17 controls
found the exception item (Stimulus Number 6) the
most difficult to learn. There was no significant
interaction between group and rectangle, F(9,
243) ¼ 1.15. In summary, the HFA group found
the category structure significantly more difficult
to learn than did the controls, but there was no evi-
dence of differences in the rate at which they learnt
the exception item.
The above analysis was conducted on the data
from the entire training phase, during which
different participants received different amounts
of training. However, it could be argued that the
extra blocks of exemplars seen by the HFA
group might obscure differences in discrimination
or general learning strategy. For example, the
HFA participants might have learned the excep-
tion item better than did controls earlier on learn-
ing but this effect could then have been obscured
by requiring a large number of trials to learn the
other items. To investigate this issue, we analysed
the data from the first 25 blocks only. Up until this
point, all participants were still in the training
phase and had therefore received the same
amount of training. We divided the 25 blocks
into five divisions and, for each participant,
found the mean accuracy for the exception item
and for the normal rectangles. We averaged
together responses to the normal rectangles,
unlike in the analysis above, because we had far
fewer data points than previously and we also
had an extra factor, that of block. We then
performed an ANOVA on these figures, with rec-
tangle (normal and exception) and block (1 to 5) as
repeated measures factors, and group (HFA and
control) as a between-participants factor. The
results of this analysis were very similar to results
of the analysis carried out using the data from
the entire training set. We found that both
groups learned the exemplars better over time,
Figure 2. Proportion correct during the training phase. Error bars
are the standard errors for each stimulus, within developmental
group. Stimulus numbers refer to the category structure shown in
Figure 1, where 6 is the exception item.
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F(4, 100) ¼ 32.08, MSE ¼ 0.29, p , .0005,
and that classification of the exception rect-
angle was poorer than that for the others,
F(1, 25) ¼ 29.40, MSE ¼ 0.42, p , .0005. This
effect was present in both the control participants,
F(1, 16)¼ 19.18, MSE¼ 0.40, p, .0005, and the
HFA group, F(1, 9) ¼ 11.67, MSE ¼ 0.45, p ¼
.008. The difference between the exception item
and the normal rectangles diminished over
blocks, F(4, 100) ¼ 5.14, MSE ¼ 0.30, p ¼
.001. The HFA group performed worse than con-
trols overall, F(1, 25)¼ 3.6, MSE ¼ 1.24, p¼ .07,
and this difference diminished over learn-
ing, F(4, 100) ¼ 2.34, MSE ¼ 0.29, p ¼ .061.
However, there was no interaction of group
with rectangle, F(1, 25) ¼ 0.045, MSE ¼ 0.42,
p ¼ .834, nor was there an interaction of group,
rectangle and block, F(4, 100) ¼ 0.771, MSE ¼
0.303, p ¼ .547. As we found when we analysed
the complete training set, the HFA group
appeared to learn more slowly overall, but there
was no evidence of any learning differences
related to the exception item.
Test phase
Figure 3 shows the proportion of correct responses
in the test phase to the 10 rectangles that partici-
pants had learnt to classify during the training
phase. Performance on the exception item
(Stimulus 6) was clearly worse than that on the
other nine items, despite the fact that all items
had been learnt to criterion in the training phase.
This observation was confirmed by performing a
repeated measures ANOVA on the proportion
correct with group and rectangle as factors. A
significant main effect of rectangle was found,
F(9, 225) ¼ 17.12, MSE ¼ 0.1, p , .001, indicat-
ing that the exception item was reliably different to
other items (see Figure 3), but there was no main
effect of group, F(1, 25) ¼ 0.9, MSE ¼ 0.56, p ¼
.352. Importantly, there was no significant inter-
action between group and rectangle, F(9, 225) ¼
1.69, MSE ¼ 0.1, p ¼ .094, a finding that fails
to support the reduced perceptual similarity
hypothesis.
Despite our failure to find a reliable interaction,
we analysed performance between groups on the
exception item in particular because the reduced
perceptual similarity hypothesis makes a priori
predictions regarding this item. Mean proportion
correct for the HFA group was .73 (SD ¼ 0.10),
while for the controls it was .78 (SD ¼ 0.050).
Thus, the means were in the opposite direction
to that predicted by the reduced perceptual simi-
larity hypothesis. Analysis of confidence intervals
demonstrated that we can be 95% certain that
the mean HFA correct score cannot be more
than .014 greater than that of the control
group, assuming t(25), one-tailed, because the
reduced perceptual similarity hypothesis predicts
MHFAMcontrol. Thus, these results suggest that
any effects of reduced perceptual similarity are
negligible in such a task as ours.
We also conducted a correlational analysis
involving the factors of age, verbal mental age,
and performance mental age. This analysis
revealed that classification of the exception item
was not associated with age (r ¼ .194, p ¼ .33)
nor with verbal mental age (r ¼ .196, p ¼ .53),
but was positively correlated with performance
mental age: r ¼ .51; Z(27) ¼ 2.748; p ¼ .006. A
one-way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was
therefore performed with classification of the
exception item as the dependent variable, group
as the between-subjects factor, and performance
mental age as the covariate. The main effect of
performance mental age approached significance,
F(1, 23) ¼ 4.00, p ¼ .058, and there was a
significant interaction between the group and
Figure 3. Proportion correct for responses to training items, during
the testing phase. Stimulus numbers refer to the category structure
shown in Figure 1, where 6 is the exception item. Error bars are
the standard errors for each stimulus, within developmental group.
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performance mental age, F(1, 23) ¼ 4.6, p ¼ .043.
Crucially, however, once the variance due to per-
formance mental age had been factored out,
control participants showed reliably better responses
on the exception item, F(1, 23) ¼ 4.7, p ¼ .041. A
reliable interaction between the two groups of
participants and performance mental age was
present, F(1, 23) ¼ 4.6, p ¼ .043, although the
main effect of performance mental age was narrowly
nonsignificant, F(1, 23) ¼ 4.00, p ¼ .058.
In summary, the results indicate that partici-
pants in the HFA group did not perform more
accurately than those in the control group. If
anything, the small effects present in the
ANCOVA analysis point to an advantage for the
control group—effects that are in the opposite
direction to those predicted by the reduced per-
ceptual similarity hypothesis.
Figure 4 shows the classification of the six novel
rectangles in the test phase as indexed by the pro-
portion of A responses. Results were subjected to
an ANOVA with rectangle as a repeated measure
and group as a between-subjects factor. There
were no reliable effects involving group (Fs , 1).
Model fitting
The results from the test phase were modelled
using the GCM (Nosofsky, 1986). This model
assumes that exemplars are represented as points
in multidimensional psychological space, with
exemplars from a particular category tending to
cluster together because they generally have
similar values on each dimension. The coordinates
of the exemplars are the psychological coordinates
derived from the MDS analysis of similarity
ratings.
The distance, dij, between two items Xi and Xj
is defined by the equation
dij ¼
X
m
wmjxim  x jmjr
" #1=r
(1)
where xim and xjm are the coordinates of the two
items on dimension m. The r parameter dictates
the metric of the space. If r is equal to 1 then
the distance is determined by summing the differ-
ences between the coordinates of the two objects
on each dimension, whereas if r is equal to 2
(Euclidean space) then distance is simply the
shortest straight line between the two points.
The similarity, sij, between Xi and Xj is then
defined as an exponential function of the distance
between them:
si, j ¼ exp ( c  Di, j ) (2)
where c is a scaling parameter that determines how
easy the individual objects are to discriminate.
Figure 5 shows how similarity varies as a function
Figure 4. Proportion of ‘A’ responses for the rectangles presented in
the test phase only. Error bars are the standard errors for each
stimulus, within developmental group.
Figure 5. Similarity as a function of distance and the value of the c
parameter. At high values of c, objects are less similar than at low
values.
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of c and the distance between two items as
determined by the coordinates of the object in
psychological space. When c is high, the function
drops off sharply so that at a given distance
apart, two items are relatively dissimilar and can
be easily discriminated. Conversely, when c is
low, the same two items appear more similar and
are relatively difficult to discriminate. The c para-
meter is generally a free parameter estimated by
minimizing the difference between the model’s
predictions and an individual participant’s
responses. Put in these terms, the c parameter
can be seen as a useful way of measuring a partici-
pant’s sense of perceptual similarity. As such, the
reduced perceptual similarity hypothesis would
predict increased c parameters in the HFA group
relative to controls.
The final stage of the model involves assigning
the item to a particular category. In the GCM, the
probability that the object, Xi, is assigned to a
particular category Ck is given by the sum of the
similarities between Xi and each item in Ck
divided by the summed similarity of Xi, to all
items in memory.
p(Ck j Xi) ¼
P
j[k sijPN
j¼1 sij
(3)
In summary, the algorithm first calculates the
distance between the unknown item and the
known exemplars using Equation 1, then trans-
forms these distances into similarities using
Equation 2, and finally calculates the probability
that the object belongs in a particular category
using Equation 3.
The GCM was fitted to the data by adjusting
the c parameter value to minimize the summed
square error between each participant’s responses
and the model predictions, resulting in a single c
parameter value for each participant. Because
there were no a priori assumptions regarding the
most appropriate MDS solution, or the most
appropriate GCM distance metric, this analysis
was performed for all possible combinations of
these factors.
We first used the MDS solutions as the set of
exemplar coordinates for the GCM. All three
solutions were tested, using both r ¼ 1 and r ¼ 2,
which resulted in a value of R2 that varied
between .56 and .70. However, there was no
evidence for any group differences in c parameter
values. In fact, the GCM demonstrated the best
fits to the data using the objective coordinates of
the rectangles (i.e., their heights and widths)
rather than psychological coordinates derived
from MDS. With the GCM distance metric, r,
set to 1, the R2 value was .74, and when r was
set to 2, the R2 value was .75. Figure 6 shows
the c parameters for each participant with r ¼ 2
(results were similar with r ¼ 1).6 The reduced
perceptual similarity hypothesis predicted that
the HFA group would have higher c parameters
than those in the control group. In fact, the differ-
ence was in the other direction, although not
reliably so, U 0(17) ¼ 161, p ¼ .29. Furthermore,
all the participants in the HFA group appear to
have c parameters well within the range of the
control participants, indicating that individual
differences are not obscuring a group effect.
Figure 6. The c parameter scores after fitting the GCM to the
categorization response, using the objective MDS coordinates.
6 One participant in the control group had an extremely high c value (the maximum possible value tested by our optimization
algorithm). This was because he had a near-perfect score for the training items during the testing phase, which the GCM fits
best by using an infinitely high c parameter value.
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These results do not provide evidence in support of
the reduced perceptual similarity hypothesis.
One aspect of our results that might seem unusual
is that we obtained better model fits with the objec-
tive solution than with the MDS solutions. We
believe this stems from two factors of our design.
First, because we were using a clinical sample,
there was likely to be considerable individual vari-
ation in the similarity judgements. This would
have resulted in a noisy set of coordinates from the
INDSCAL analysis. If the “true” perceptual rep-
resentation resembled the objective coordinate set
more than the results of the INDSCAL analysis,
then a better fit would be expected from the GCM
with the objective set. Second, the GCM was mod-
elled on responses that took place after the training
phase of the experiment. If there were participants
who chose to rely on only one dimension during
the similarity ratings task, they would have had to
change their representational coordinates during
training, in order to learn the category structure.
Thus, the true perceptual space may well have
changed from that described by the MDS analysis
to the objective space by the time participants
made their responses during the testing phase.
Discussion
The current study investigated the hypothesis
that autism is associated with a reduced sense of
perceptual similarity. High-functioning individ-
uals with autism and nonautistic controls first
performed a similarity ratings task, designed to
determine the psychological coordinates of the
rectangle stimuli that were used in the subsequent
categorization task. Analysis by MDS revealed a
trend suggesting that individuals in the HFA
group represented the stimuli on fewer psycho-
logical dimensions than did controls, although
this pattern was not significant. Participants then
performed a categorization task in which they
learnt to classify rectangles into two arbitrarily
defined categories. Individuals with autism took
reliably longer to learn the category structure
during the training phase of this task. However,
the main focus of this study was performance on
the test phase of this task in which participants
were required to categorize the learned stimuli
without feedback and generalize their responses
to stimuli that had not previously been categor-
ized. As expected, performance was relatively
poor on an exception item that was similar to
members of the opposite category but, contrary
to predictions, there was no evidence that this
effect was reduced among members of the HFA
group. Moreover, generalization of responses to
novel stimuli was similar in both groups.
Similarity ratings task
The main objective of the similarity ratings task
was to provide psychological coordinates for mod-
elling of the categorization task. Nevertheless, the
results of the MDS analysis suggested potentially
interesting differences between individuals with
and without autism in terms of their initial
representations of the stimuli. Specifically, partici-
pants in the HFA group showed a trend towards
higher w-scores in the INDSCAL analysis, indi-
cating that they might be basing their ratings of
the stimuli on fewer dimensions than were con-
trols. However, given that the effect was non-
significant, this result should of course be treated
with caution. Furthermore, the current data do
not demonstrate that the control participants
encoded the data using more than one dimension;
a finding that would be a necessary precursor for
using the w-score analysis as evidence that partici-
pants with autism were representing the data on
fewer dimensions than were controls. Moreover,
the current study was not specifically designed to
test the hypothesis that individuals represent
stimuli on fewer dimensions than were controls,
and, consequently, all interpretation of the MDS
analysis is post hoc. Future experiments could
investigate this issue using the same methodology,
although we would recommend collecting more
data points per participant to reduce within-
participant noise and using high-dimensional
stimuli, rather than rectangles, to test the inte-
gration ability of people with autism more fully.
Category learning
Although category learning was not the main
focus of this study, we note that the training
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phase of the categorization task provided the first
reported investigation of the process of category-
learning abilities of people with autism under
controlled conditions. Perhaps unsurprisingly,
given that individuals with autism appear to have
difficulties forming categories, the HFA group
took significantly longer than the control group
to learn the category structure. Advocates of the
reduced perceptual similarity hypothesis may be
tempted to explain this in terms of difficulties in
noticing the similarities between category exem-
plars. This would imply that for the HFA group,
the costs of not being able to group together
similar rectangles outweighed the benefits of
learning the exception item relatively easily.
However, both groups found that the exception
item was reliably more difficult to learn than the
other rectangles, and there were no differences in
the rate in which different groups learned the
different types of rectangle. Thus, we found no
evidence to suggest that a reduced perceptual
similarity hindered learning of the category
structure.
The fact that the exception item produced most
errors during training means that participants were
required to change their initial responses to the
exception item in order to learn the category struc-
ture. There is considerable evidence that people
with autism have specific difficulties on tests of
executive function when they are required to
change the dimensions of a stimulus to which
they are attending (e.g., Ciesielski & Harris,
1997; Hughes, Russell, & Robbins, 1994;
Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999), and, arguably, such
difficulties could explain the relatively slow
learning of the category structure. However, it is
important to note that, whereas tests of executive
functioning require participants to inhibit
responses that have previously been reinforced,
in our task the correct response (and feedback) to
the exception item was always the same. Thus, if
executive deficits are to explain poor category
learning then one must assume that individuals
in the HFA group had difficulty inhibiting the
exception item response because of the compe-
tition from the similar rectangles. This suggestion
appears plausible but rests on the assumption that
individuals in the HFA group are sensitive to the
similarity of the surrounding items—an assump-
tion that is at odds with the reduced perceptual
similarity hypothesis.
Finally, it is possible that participants in the
HFA group started the categorization task with
inappropriate assumptions about the best way of
representing the rectangles, and this hindered
their learning because they had to change the
representation during the learning process. This
possibility is compatible with the idea, discussed
above, that individuals in the HFA group initially
represented the stimuli on fewer dimensions than
did controls. Clearly, further research with para-
digms specifically designed to investigate category
learning will be necessary to distinguish between
these different explanations for slow category
learning in autism.
Categorization and generalization
As expected, performance in the testing phase was
reliably poorer on the exception item than on the
other rectangles, despite the fact that participants
had learnt to correctly classify the exception item
in the training phase of the experiment. This
presumably was a result of interference from
surrounding rectangles (see Figure 1). However,
the reduced similarity hypothesis predicted that
those in the HFA group would perform more
accurately than controls on this exception item
because they would be less influenced by the
surrounding rectangles. In the event, there was
no significant advantage for the HFA group.
The results of the test phase were modelled
using the GCM (Nosofsky, 1986), which
allowed us take into account responses to all
the items, rather than just the exception item,
and provided us with a measure of individual
participant performance. The reduced similarity
hypothesis predicted that individuals in the HFA
group would have higher scaling parameters
(i.e., c parameters) than would the controls.
Again, however, the trend was in the opposite
direction—there were no differences between
the groups, and no individual participant in the
HFA group differed from the sample of controls.
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Overall, therefore, the results failed to support
the reduced perceptual similarity hypothesis and
contrast with a number of other recent findings.
There are a number of potential explanations for
this. First, it might be argued that there was
insufficient statistical power in the design.
However, participants were tested 40 times each
on the exception item with little evidence of
ceiling or floor effects that might have masked
an advantage for the HFA group. Furthermore,
confidence intervals for performance on the excep-
tion item indicated that any effect of reduced per-
ceptual similarity is likely to be very small. A
second potential criticism concerns the matching
of controls: The mean age of the HFA group
was higher than that of the control group, and
performance mental age was lower than that of
the control group. However, there was no evidence
for a correlation between age and classification of
the exception item, and controlling for perform-
ance mental age by covariation resulted in an
advantage for the control group on the exception
item. This latter result is in the reverse direction
to the reduced perceptual similarity hypothesis.
A third and more theoretical concern might
be that exemplar models are not appropriate to
apply to this experimental design and that it is
invalid to assume, for example, that performance
on the exception item is determined by perceptual
similarity, or that the results can be modelled
with the GCM. The most plausible alternative
model would be some form of rule-plus-exception
model (e.g., Erickson & Kruschke, 1998;
Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1998), which would take
the form of a rule (e.g., “respond ‘A’ if the
rectangle is in some corner of the space, ‘B’ if it
is in another corner”), but with some rectangles
remembered on an individual basis. However,
these models still require an aspect of generaliza-
tion around the exception item to account for
the fact that it is remembered significantly less
well than other old items during the testing
phase (both in the control participants and in
the HFA group). The task therefore assesses
perceptual similarity even under the assumptions
of a different model. Consequently, even if
the modelling of the data using the GCM is not
appropriate, the standard inferential statistics
used to analyse responses to the exception
item still provide evidence against reduced
similarity.
A further issue concerns the generalizability of
the current results. The complexity of the task
and the large number of trials that had to be com-
pleted combined to ensure that it was only possible
to test high-functioning adults with autism. One
possibility is that reduced perceptual similarity is
only found in younger or less able individuals
with autism, and this could potentially account
for the discrepancy between the current results
and the reduced prototype effect demonstrated
by the children with autism in the study conducted
by Klinger and Dawson (1995, 2001). While this
possibility cannot be firmly ruled out, our results
do strongly suggest that findings from other
studies with high-functioning adults with
autism, such as the reduced transfer effect noted
by Plaisted et al. (1998b) and the relatively good
performance on the embedded figures task
reported by Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen (1997),
cannot be explained purely in terms of reduced
perceptual similarity, as has been previously
argued (Plaisted, 2001; Plaisted et al., 1998b).
Finally, we note that our findings are at odds
with those of Bonnel et al. (2003), who recently
found evidence for enhanced sensitivity to pitch
in people with HFA—a result consistent with
the reduced perceptual similarity hypothesis. One
obvious difference between the studies is the type
of stimuli used. Thus, it is possible that reduced
perceptual similarity in autism is restricted to the
auditory domain. A second potentially crucial
difference is in the dimensionality of the stimuli;
the current study employed multidimensional
rectangles, whereas Bonnel et al. (2003) used
stimuli that varied on a single dimension. It is
possible that difficulties in integrating dimensions
in the current study could mask otherwise superior
discrimination abilities. However, it is important
to note that by the time our participants had
completed the training phase of our experiment,
they had succeeded in integrating the multi-
dimensional stimuli. Clearly, further research
using simple and complex stimuli from different
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modalities is required to determine the strengths
and weaknesses in categorization and discrimi-
nation abilities in autism.
The results of the current study provided no
evidence to support the hypothesis that autism is
associated with a reduced sense of perceptual simi-
larity. Instead, we propose the novel hypothesis
that individuals with autism have a tendency to
represent objects on fewer dimensions than do
typically developing individuals, as we suggested
above when discussing the similarity ratings task.
This “reduced dimensions” hypothesis could
explain the reduced prototype effect in autism
reported by Klinger and Dawson (1995, 2001).
It was suggested that individuals with autism in
that experiment were not able to choose the
most representative exemplar from the category
because they had not coded the dimensions that
defined the prototype. This situation may have
arisen because children with autism chose to
code the objects on the fewest dimensions possible
to perform the training task—that is, on the
between-category dimension—whereas controls
chose to represent the objects more completely.
The reduced dimensions hypothesis could also
explain why the HFA group required more
blocks to learn the category structure than did con-
trols in this experiment—the HFA group would
have had to change their perceptual space in
order to learn to classify the rectangles, whereas
the controls were already attending to the appro-
priate dimensions (see Palmeri & Nosofsky,
2001, for evidence that the perceptual space can
be different after a categorization task). More
speculatively, the hypothesis could also explain
some of the difficulties in generalization in every-
day situations that Plaisted (2001) has attributed
to reduced perceptual similarity. Objects and situ-
ations in real life are typically complex and multi-
dimensional. If one focuses on a very limited
aspect of a stimulus (such as the colour of an
object) then there is a high probability that this
will be a superficial rather than a defining feature
of the object. Subsequent encounters with other
superficially different members of the same cat-
egory will then be treated as an entirely novel
experience.
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
The experiments presented in this paper were
designed to test the hypothesis that people with
autism have reduced perceptual similarity. We
found no evidence in support of this hypothesis.
In addition to our principal finding, we have
made several other contributions. First, we have
introduced a precise definition of reduced percep-
tual similarity based on computational models
from the study of categorization. Second, we
have provided evidence that people with autism
may have difficultly in learning categories.
Third, we have suggested a novel hypothesis con-
cerning the cause of some of the generalization
difficulties in autism: that of coding objects on
fewer dimensions than controls in circumstances
in which such a strategy can be effective. The
results of the current study are consistent with
this hypothesis but it clearly demands further
investigation.
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